One Man, Two Unions, and Three Billion Euros: A Failing US-EU Security Alliance
Image by Gerd Altmann from Pixabay
An Unraveling Security Order
‘Speak softly and carry a big stick’, former US President Theodore Roosevelt was rumored to have said. Donald Trump never really seemed to heed the first part of that sentence and has certainly been wielding the stick of US military might for all the wrong reasons.
From threatening to add Greenland and Canada to American territory, then widely imposing extensive tariffs on other countries, Trump has made waves in the first few weeks of his second term. In the past week alone, US Vice President JD Vance massively bungled his message at the Munich Security Conference and met with Alice Weidel, the far-right AfD’s candidate for Chancellor in Germany. Trump held discussions with Russia about Ukraine without Ukraine seated at the negotiating table. He then proceeded to blame the war on Ukraine and called Zelensky a dictator, all while the White House made Trump out to be a king – any playwright would find such dramatic irony to be too heavy-handed. It has been a long week for Americans and Europeans alike – but most of all for those in Ukraine.
In order to ensure Ukrainian security, the EU should reimagine its approach to defence in a way that accounts for a potential gaping hole left by the US.
What’s In A Name?: A Europe United in Defence
There is an uncomfortable truth that must be stated: for a number of reasons, both legitimate and misguided, Americans are unhappy with the state of the nation and have re-elected a leader who incited an assault on democracy and believes in an America First agenda. American allies should not have to pay the price for domestic failures, but it is a reality which European allies must quickly adjust to, both for Ukraine and for the future of European security.
The US would be wrong to ‘leave halfway’ through its commitments, but if Trump cannot be relied upon to keep to the traditional view of American obligations in the realm of international affairs, then Ukraine and Europe must prepare itself for a new era of defence policy. As troubling as the new American administration has been, it is perhaps the kick that Europe needed to supercharge its move toward a collective European defence and a revised vision of the Common Security and Defence Policy.
Irrespective of who the US President may be, NATO remains the keystone of European defence. It is enshrined as such in Article 42(7) TEU, which requires NATO to be the foundation of defence for the EU Member States which are a part of this alliance. The tensions between such a commitment and an increasing political will for European defence are palpable: EU citizens want a stronger European defence, made for and by Europeans.
As outlined in a European Commission Report in 2022, defence and security was named the top priority of EU residents. 93% of Europeans agreed that EU Member States should act jointly when it comes to defending the territory of the EU, and 85% agreed that cooperation in defence matters at the EU level should be increased.
An expansion of European security capabilities in light of a tumultuous relationship with the US would also benefit the EU economically: according to a European Commission communication on the European Defence Fund, the ‘lack of cooperation between Member States in the field of security and defence is estimated to cost between €25 billion and €100 billion every year’.
The EU has clearly begun responding to those concerns and has not idly sat by since the war in Ukraine began. In fact, the EU has extensively supported the Ukrainian war effort, pouring billions into Ukraine. Increases in defence spending and development have skyrocketed: initiatives like the passage of the EDIRPA Regulation for procuring critical defence products and the creation of the European Defence Fund have enhanced the standing of EU security.
It is not enough though. For Europe to protect itself without the guarantee of the American military, it will require a serious long-term re-evaluation of its relationship with other countries. For instance, decreasing trade dependence on China (as the trade relationship has been noted to be ‘persistently in favour of China’) is a key strategic move that must occur in the future. A paradigm shift on the CSDP and external affairs is long overdue.
While NATO still does serve as the cornerstone of Western security, another vision of European defence can simultaneously exist. Scholars like Brian Burgoon, David van der Duin, and Francesco Nicoli have imagined new frameworks for European defence that still operate within the confines of NATO but provide for considerably enhanced EU-led security. In a working paper titled ‘What Would Europeans Want A European Defence Union To Look Like’, they surveyed residents in Western European countries about improving EU defence. The report concludes that respondents generally preferred ‘relatively more ambitious policy packages at the EU level, inclusive of joint gas procurement, no veto rights, no opt outs, financed through repurposing existing expenditure or by increasing progressive taxation’. All of these measures can strengthen the EU while not sidelining NATO.
Furthermore, it might even be possible that the creation of a ‘European army’ alongside the existing NATO alliance, as called for by prominent EU figures like former European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker and former German Chancellor Angela Merkel, could be within sight. A 2019 article on attitudes in Germany toward the creation of a European army indicated that a majority of Germans supported a common European army and 54% of Germans perceived US foreign and security policy as threatening the cohesion of NATO. These figures could very well have shifted even further after Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and the return of Trump to the helm of the American administration. Public support for such measures can push political will in Brussels toward reshaping the meaning of European defence.
Taking measures to establish an extensive European defence without American firepower is critical to ensuring the freedom of Ukraine and the long-term security of Europe.
American Attitudes: A Snapshot of a Cynical Country
On the other side of the Atlantic, it is critical for the US to recognise that cutting Europe out of the equation is a mistake. The EU is a strong market power and a key global partner who needs to be acknowledged as such.
The presence of European countries in NATO, alongside other American allies, is essential to protecting Ukraine. The EU has recently sent 3 billion euros as the first part of its Macro-Financial Assistance loan to Ukraine. Trump, who once called NATO ‘obsolete’, fails to recognise the value in the shared transatlantic burden of global security.
UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer has recently said that the UK is ready to put troops on the ground for Ukraine, and such measures are to be commended. It was a cowardly move on the Biden administration’s part not to take the same stance when the invasion happened, especially when he knew of the possibility of Trump’s return in the context of a world marred by conflict.
Increasing American aid and military assistance for Ukraine will be difficult, nonetheless, because the American public’s support for Ukraine is waning. A Pew Research Center report from last week indicates that 30% of Americans say that the US is providing too much support to Ukraine. A cynical populace looking at hiking prices in grocery stores and gas stations is stagnating in its willpower: even amongst Democrats, there is little will to increase support. Only 35% of Democrat respondents indicated that America is not giving enough support to Ukraine. Clearly, increasing American support from its current state will face an uphill battle in Washington DC, and the EU should prepare accordingly.
However, there is hope in terms of American views toward Europe as an ally. The percentage of Americans who said that European allies should increase their defence spending decreased by 8% since April 2024, and this trend holds true across both Republican and Democrat respondents. Finding a way forward in the joint pursuit of global security will undoubtedly be challenging, but it is by no means an impossible feat.
Moving Forward: Uncertainty and Opportunity
Don’t sound the alarm for the end for the US-EU security alliance just yet. In spite of Trump’s recent actions, there is still hope for the survival of the transatlantic relationship. Contrary to many of Trump's cabinet picks, Marco Rubio, the Secretary of State, is a sensible choice and is perhaps an indication that Trump’s actions can still be reigned in. Irrespective of whether or not one agrees with his political views, Rubio is capable and qualified, which was recognised by the Senate, who approved his nomination unanimously – the only cabinet member to receive such support. As a known advocate for international engagement, Rubio has stated that Ukraine and Europe will be a part of Ukrainian peace talks.
There is, of course, always the risk of Trump's tendency toward turnovers impacting Rubio at some point in the future. Still, so long as Rubio is in office, some semblance of consistency in American foreign policy will still exist.
On a long-term view of the situation, there is still hope that one man cannot destroy an alliance formed through decades of close cooperation. The two unions can still survive this chapter: after all, even after messy and controversial military missions in the Middle East, the US and EU remained allies. The EU has the opportunity to redefine its relationship with the US in these challenging times, as well as spearhead its own initiatives to improve European security.
The story of one man’s impact on the global order cannot end with quiet resignation: instead, this could be the beginning of a new chapter with a renewed European defence policy.